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Creating Markets for New Vaccines
Part II: Design Issues
Michael Kremer, Harvard University, TheBrookings Institution, and NBER
Executive Summary
Several programs have been proposedto improve incentives for researchon
vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV, andto help increase accessibility of
vaccines once they are developed. The U.S.administration's 2000 budget pro-
posed a tax credit that would match each dollarof vaccine sales with a dollar of
tax credit. The President of the World Bank hasproposed a $1 billion fund to
provide concessional loans to countries to purchasevaccines if and when they
are developed. European political leaders have spokenfavorably about the
concept of a vaccine purchase fund. Thispaper explores the design of such pro-
grams, focusing on commitments to purchase new vaccines.
For vaccine purchase commitments tospur research, potential vaccine devel-
opers must believe that the sponsor will notrenege on the commitment once
vaccines have been developed and researchcosts sunk. Courts have ruled that
similar commitments are legally bindingcontracts. Given appropriate legal
language, the key determinant of credibilitywill therefore be eligibility and
pricing rules, rather than whether fundsare physically set aside in separate ac-
counts. The credibility of purchase commitmentscan be enhanced by specify-
ing rules governing eligibility and pricing ofvaccines in advance and insulat-
ing those interpreting these rules from politicalpressure through long terms.
Requiring candidate vaccines to meet basic technicalrequirements, normally
including approval by some regulatoryagency, such as the U.S. FDA, would
help ensure that funds were spent onlyon effective vaccines. Requiring devel-
oping countries to contribute copayments wouldhelp ensure that they felt that
the vaccines were useful given the conditionsin their countries.
The U.S. Orphan Drug Act'ssuccess in stimulating research and develop-
ment is widely attributed to a provision awardingmarket exclusivity to the de-
veloper of the first drug for a condition unlesssubsequent drugs are clinically
superior. Purchases under a vaccine purchaseprogram could be governed by a
similar market exclusivity provision.
A purchase commitment program couldstart by offering a fairly modest
price. If this proved inadequate tospur sufficient research, the promised price
could be increased. This procedure mimicsauctions, which are often efficient
procurement methods when costs are unknown. As longas prices do not rise ata rate substantially greaterthan the interest rate, vaccine developerswould not
have incentives to withhold vaccines fromthe market.
The World Bank has termed health interventionscosting less than $100 per
year of life saved as highlycost-effective for poor countries. If donors pledge
approximately $250 million per year for each vaccinefor 10 years, vaccine pur-
chases would cost approximately $10 per yearof life saved. It is unlikely that
vaccines for all three diseases would bedeveloped simultaneously, but if do-
nors wanted to limit their exposure,they could cap their total promised vac-
cine spending under the program,for example at $520 million annually. No
funds would be spent or pledges calledunless a vaccine were developed.
I.Introduction
Several initiatives have recently beenproposed to create incentives for
research on vaccines against diseases such asmalaria, tuberculosis, and
AIDS, and to increase accessibility of vaccines oncethey are developed.
The president of the World Bankrecently said that the institution is
planning to establish a $1 billion fund tohelp finance purchases of new
vaccines, if and when they aredeveloped (Financial Times 2000) al-
though the Bank has not yet acted on thisinitiative. The U.S. adminis-
tration's 2000 budget included a tax creditfor vaccine sales that would
effectively double the developing countrymarket for new vaccines
against diseases that kill more than onemillion people each year
(http: //www.treas.gov/taxpOlicy/libraTY/grnOO.PdO. The tax cred-
its would be capped at $1 billion over10 years. The concept of a vac-
cine purchase fund has also receivedsupport from European political
leaders (www.auswartigeS.amt.de, 1999;DFID 2000).
Although malaria, tuberculosis, and Africanstrains of AIDS kill al-
most 5 million people each year, they arethe subject of little vaccine re-
search. Potential vaccine developers fearthat they would not be able to
sell enough vaccines at a high enoughprice to recoup their research in-
vestments. This is both becausethese diseases primarily affect poor
countries, and because vaccine markets areseverely distorted. The pro-
posed programs could both create incentivesfor vaccine research and
help improve access to any vaccinesdeveloped (see the companion pa-
per, "Creating Marketsfor New Vaccines: Part I: Rationale").They
would not require any expenditureunless and until vaccines were
developed.
This paper addresses the many design issuesthat would arise in es-
tablishing such programs. It focuses onthe design of a vaccine pur-
chase commitment, but much of theanalysis carries over to the
analysis of tax credits and a World Bankloan fund. Policymakers con-
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sidering establishing suchprograms face a host of questions. Howcan
commitments be made credible to vaccinedevelopers? How should eli-
gibility of candidate vaccines bedetermined? What prices shouldbe
paid for vaccines, and should theseprices vary with vaccine character-
istics? If multiple vaccinesare developed, which should be purchased?
Should recipient countries providecopayments, and if so, how much?
How cost-effective would suchprograms be?
If potential vaccine developersare to invest in research, they must
believe that once they have sunk fundsinto developing a vaccine, the
sponsors of a vaccine purchase program willnot renege on their com-
mitments by paying a price thatcovers only the cost of manufacturing,
and not research. Section II of thispaper discusses factors affecting the
credibility of a vaccine purchasecommitment. Courts have held that
similar public commitments to rewardcontest winners or to purchase
specified goods constitute legally bindingcontracts and that the deci-
sions of independent parties appointedin advance to adjudicate such
programs are binding. This suggests that ifprograms contain appropri-
ate legal language, the key determinantof their credibility will not be
whether funds are physicallyset aside in a separate account, but the
rules determining eligibility and pricing,and the procedures for adju-
dicating decisions under these rules.If potential vaccine developersare
to invest in research, they must be confidentthat the adjudicators will
not abuse their power. The credibility ofa vaccine purchase commit-
ment can be enhanced by clearly specifyingeligibility and pricing
rules, insulating decision makers frompolitical pressure through long
terms of service, and including formerindustry officials on the adjudi-
cation committee.
Section III argues that requiringcountries that receive vaccines to
provide copayments in exchange forvaccines will give countries incen-
tives to carefully investigate whethercandidate vaccines are appropri-
ate for their local conditions. Moreover,for any fixed level of donor
contributions, requiringcopayments gives potential vaccine develop-
ers greater incentives to conduct research.
Section IV outlines a possibleprocess for determining vaccine eligi-
bility and pricing. Candidatevaccines would first have to meetsome
minimal technical requirements, whichwould ordinarily include clear-
ance by a regulatory agency, suchas the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA). They would then besubject to a market test: Nations
wishing to purchase vaccineswould need to providea modest
copayment tied to their per capita income andspend down an account
assigned to them within theprogram. Any vaccine meeting these76
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requirements would be eligiblefor purchase at some base price. Vac-
cines exceeding these minimumrequirements could potentially receive
bonus payments tied to vaccineeffectiveness.
Section V discusses procedures ifmultiple vaccines are developed
for a single disease. The developerof the first vaccine against a disease
creates enormous social benefits.Developers of subsequent vaccines
create benefits only to the extentthat their vaccines are superior or
serve populations that arenot served by the first vaccine.This suggests
that rewards should be greatestfor the first vaccine developer. TheU.S.
Orphan Drug Act specifies that thefirst developer has market exclusiv-
ity unless a subsequent product isclinically superior. This provision is
generally believed to account forthe Act's success in increasing re-
search on orphan drugs. An analogousprovision could grant market
exclusivity for purchases under the programto the first vaccine devel-
oped unless subsequent vaccines wereclinically superior.
Section VI discusses vaccine pricingand coverage. Research and de-
velopment on vaccines is typically veryexpensive, but manufacturing
additional doses is usually reasonablycheap. Given total revenue from
a vaccine, researchincentives are likely to be fairly similarif few doses
are sold at a high price, or manydoses are sold at a lower price. This
suggests that it is efficient to pay perimmunized child, rather than per
dose, and to include countries anddemographic groups in the program
as long as vaccinationis cost-effective at the incrementalcost of pro-
ducing additional doses (ratherthan at the average price per person
immunized paid under the program).The total market promised by
the program should be largeenough to induce substantial effort by
vaccine developers, but lessthan the social value of the vaccine.A
rough rule of thumb in the industry isthat a $250 million annual mar-
ket is needed to motivatesubstantial research. A program inwhich
donors provide approximately $250million in average annual contri-
butions and copayments averageanother $86 million annually would
cost approximately $10 per yearof life saved. The World Bank has
termed health interventions costing lessthan $100 per year of life saved
as highly cost-effective(World Bank 1993).
One way to avoid either paying morethan necessary for a vaccine or
offering too little to stimulateresearch would be to offer a relatively
modest price initially, and if this priceproved insufficient, to raise the
promised price gradually until itproved sufficient to spur vaccine de-
velopment. As long as the pricedid not increase at a rate substantially
greater than the interest rate, vaccinedevelopers would not have incen-
tives to withhold vaccines fromthe market in hopes of obtaining aNew Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues 77
higher price. It is unlikely that vaccinesfor all three diseases would be
developed simultaneously, but ifdonors wished to limit their potential
liability, they could cap theircommitted annual expenditure.
Section VII discusses the appropriatescope of vaccine purchase com-
mitments. Should the program be limitedto vaccines, or also include
drugs? Which diseases should becovered?
The conclusion briefly considers thepolitics of programs to improve
vaccine markets. It then discusses theproposed U.S. and World Bank
programs and how a private foundation couldparticipate in a pur-
chase commitmentprogram.
This paper buildson earlier work. The idea of an HJV vaccinepur-
chase program was discussed in WHO1996, and advocated bya coali-
tion of organizations coordinated bythe International AIDS Vaccine
Initiative (IAVI) at the 1997 Denver G8summit. Since then, the idea has
been explored by the World BankAIDS Vaccine Task Force (World
Bank 1999, 2000). Kremer and Sachs(1999) and Sachs (1999) have dis-
cussed such programs in the popularpress. This paper also draws on
earlier work on vaccines, includingBatson 1998, Dupuy and Freidel
1990, Mercer Management Consulting1998, and Milstien and Batson
1994, and on the broader academic literatureon research incentives, in-
cluding Guell and Fischbaum 1995,Johnston and Zeckhauser 1991,
Lanjouw and Cockburn 1999, Lichtmann1997, Russell 1998, Scotchmer
1999, Shavell and van Ypserle 1998,and Wright 1983.
II.The Credibility of Vaccine PurchaseCommitments
For a vaccine purchase commitmentto be effective in spurring newre-
search, potential vaccine developersmust believe that once they have
sunk money into producinga vaccine, it will be purchased ata price
that covers their risk-adjustedcosts of research, as well as theirmanu-
facturing costs. The first subsection,titled Legal Doctrine, notes that
courts have held similar commitments to belegally binding contracts
and argues that as longas the sponsor of a commitment has sufficient
funds to fulfill the commitment, physicallymoving money to a sepa-
rate account is unnecessary to provide legalcommitment. The second
subsection, titled Issues to Considerin Determining Eligibility and
Pricing, discusses some of the issuesthat would need to be addressed
in specifying eligibility and pricingrules based on technical character-
istics of a vaccine. The third subsection,titled Procedures to Increase
Credibility of a Vaccine Purchase Commitment,argues that some dis-
cretion will be needed to interpret howgeneral eligibility and pricing78
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rules apply to any specificcandidate vaccine, and discusses howthe
credibility of adjudicating institutions couldbe enhanced.
Legal Doctrine
This section argues that a suitablydesigned commitment will be inter-
preted by the courts as a legallybinding contract, and that hence the
key credibility issue will not beoutright default by the program spon-
sor, or whether moneyis physically set aside in a separatevaccine pur-
chase fund, but rather questions overthe interpretation of program
rules.
Courts have ruled that publiclyadvertised contests are legally bind-
ing contracts (Morantz and Sloane2000). As summarized in Sullivan
1988, sponsors of contests arecontractually obligated to pay the win-
ners according totheir public announcements. A contestantwho per-
forms the requested act has formed avalid and binding contract with
the promoter. Attempts to escapeliability by changing contest rules af-
ter a contestant has acceptedthe offer by performing the desired act are
generally treated as breach of contract.Advertisements with certain
specifications (identification of good,definite quantity of good, etc.) for
the purchase of goods at specifiedprices have also been found to be le-
gally binding. (See Vaccaro 1972for a summary and analysis of
doctrine.)
Moreover, if the procedures in a conteststipulate who will judge the
contest, decisions made by thestipulated judge of the contest are usu-
ally treated as conclusive (Morantzand Sloane 2000). The majority
view among courts is that judges'decisions are conclusive as long as
they are made in good faith, although some casesfind that contracts
giving one party the unilateralright to decide disputes are unenforce-
able. When the judge of the contest is anindependent party, the courts
almost universally hold the decision asfinal unless the decision was
made in bad faith, or the judgesexceeded the authority specified in
contest rules.1
There are a number of precedentsfor programs to reward developers
of new technologies. The Britishgovernment established a £20,000
prize for a method of determininglongitude at sea after a fleet got lost
and struck rocks, drowning 2,000sailors. The prize was won byJohn
Harrison for the chronometer.2 Morerecently, the Kremer prize for
human-powered flight led to the historicflight of the Gossamer Al-
batross across the EnglishChannel (Grosser 1991). The $30 million
"golden carrot" tournament for an energyefficient refrigerator spon-New Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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sored by 24 U.S. electric utilitiesoffered to pay the winningteam a cer-
tain amount for every unit sold.Whirlpool won thetournament with a
line of refrigerators thatoperated 70% more efficiently than1992 fed-
eral requirements.
Given that legally bindingcontracts can be written, physicallyset- ting aside funds inan escrow account is not necessary fora commit- ment to be binding, as longas the sponsor of a vaccine purchase
commitment has sufficient fundsto fulfill the commitment. Thekey
questions for credibility revolvearound specifying eligibility andpric- ing rules and procedures foradjudicating disputes under theserules.
Depending on legal language,commitments could be mademore or
less binding. The optionsrange from a simple announcement ofan in-
tention to purchase vaccines,to a legally bindingannouncement with
details on eligibility and pricing.The more binding thecommitment,
the stronger the incentives forpotential vaccine developers. Ingeneral, there is a trade-off betweenflexibility and crediblycommitting to pay for a vaccine. Imperfectcommitment reduces both theexpected reve-
nue for vaccine developers and expectedcosts for the sponsor in the
same proportion. It reduces efficiencyto the extent that the partiesare
risk averse.3
Issues to Consider in DeterminingEligibility and Pricing
A program to increase themarket for vaccines could offerto purchase
vaccines meeting certain technicalspecifications, offer to matchmoney
spent on vaccine purchases by otherinstitutions, or use some combina-
tion of these approaches. Forexample, the Kremer prize laidout de-
tailed technical eligibilityrequirements. The U.S. tax creditproposal
does not specify detailedtechnical requirements, otherthan FDA ap-
proval, but merely states thata 100% tax credit will be given for salesof
vaccines to nonprofits andinternational institutions, whichwould pre-
sumably make theirown judgments as to whether candidatevaccines
are acceptable.
The following aresome of the key issues which would needto be
considered in determining vaccineeligibility and pricing basedon
technical specifications.
vaccine efficacythe reduction indisease incidenceamong those re-
ceiving the vaccine.4 Efficacymight vary in differentcircumstances.
A vaccine could potentially bemore efficacious against some strains
of the disease than others, andthus be better suited tosome geo-graphic areas than others. It couldwork for some age groups, but not
others. A vaccine might prevent severesymptoms of the disease, but
not prevent milder cases.
the number of doses required,the efficacy of the vaccine if an incom-
plete course is given, and the agesat which doses must betaken. If
too many doses arerequired, fewer people will bringtheir children
in to receive the full courseof immunization. If the vaccine canbe
given along with vaccines that arealready widely administered, de-
livery will be much cheaper.
vaccine side effects. Side effectscould differ for different subpop-
ulations. Side effects would alsoneed to be considered for people
who do not comply perfectlywith the delivery protocol. For exam-
ple, taking a partial course of amalaria vaccine could potentially in-
terfere with natural limited immunity.
the time over which the vaccineprovides protection, and whether
booster shots could extend thisperiod.
what level of rigor would berequired in the field trials. For example,
how long would subjects have tobe followed to determine the
length of protection? How manyseparate studies in differentregions
would need to be conducted to assessefficacy against different vari-
eties of the disease?
the extent to which vaccineswould lose their effectiveness overtime.
Presumably, some ongoing monitoringof vaccine effectiveness in the
field would be required, and if it appearsthat resistance to the vac-
cine is spreading, vaccinepurchases would have to bereassessed.
One possibility would be to designeligibility rules using these crite-
ria in such a way that vaccineswould be considered eligible if theymet
a cost-effectivenessthreshold.5 Eligibility and pricingrules could po-
tentially be set so that vaccinesmeeting a certain cost-effectiveness
threshold would be eligible forpurchase and vaccines exceedingthis
threshold would receive higher prices.
Note, however, that misspecifyingeligibility and pricing rules could
misdirect research incentives awayfrom appropriate vaccines, orviti-
ate research incentivesaltogether. For example, if the programfailed to
specify otherwise, it might beobligated to purchase a malaria vaccine
that interfered with the developmentof natural immunity and pro-
vided only temporary protection.Such a vaccine might merely post-
pone malaria deaths.If such a vaccine were eligiblefor purchase under
the program, researchersmight pursue it, rather than devotingtheir ef-
Kremer
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forts to more useful lines ofresearch, On the other hand, thereis a risk
that the program could setspecifications so stringent that theywould
be difficult to achieve. Thiswould discourage pharmaceuticalfirms
from following promising leads.For example, if the specificationsre-
quired 90% efficacy against allstrains of the disease, potentialvaccine
developers might notpursue a candidate vaccine that would be likely
to yield 99% protection againstmost strains, but only 85% protection
against others. If it were difficultto create a vaccine delivering 90%
protection in all regions, no vaccineat all might be developed.
Aside from specifying eligibilityrules, the program would haveto
specify pricing rules. Payingmore for superior vaccines might create
more appropriate incentives for researchers. A90% efficacious vaccine
is worth more than an 80%efficacious vaccine, anda vaccine that re-
quires no booster is worthmore than one requiring boostersevery
5 years.
Procedures to Increase Credibilityof a Vaccine Purchase Commitment
General eligibility and pricing rulescould be set out, butsomeone
would have to exercise discretionin interpreting these rulesonce vac-
cines have been developed andtested.6 Once the vaccine developerhas
sunk hundreds of millions of dollarsin research, adjudicators mightbe
tempted to offer a price that coveredonly manufacturing costsor to in-
sist on excessive product testing andimprovements. If pharmaceutical
executives suspect that the adjudicatorswill succumb to these tempta-
tions, the companies will be reluctantto invest in a vaccine.
Credibility of vaccine purchasecommitments to potential develop-
ers could be enhanced by appointingappropriate decision makers
(such as a committee withsome members who have worked in the
pharmaceutical industry), insulatingdecision makers from political
pressures through long terms of service, establishinga minimum pur-
chase price, and placing limitson the discretion of the programcom-
mittee by laying out reasonablytransparent rules for determining
eligibility and pricing. Anotherway to enhance the credibility ofa
commitment is to establish aprogram that covers a number of different
diseases which primarily affectdeveloping countries. Theprogram
would then have an incentiveto build up a reputation for fairplay.7
The experience of central banksmay offer some lessons for the de-
sign of a vaccine purchaseprogram. Just as a vaccine purchasepro-
gram would need to make a crediblecommitment to purchasean82
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effective vaccine if one weredeveloped, central banks need to headoff
inflationary expectations by crediblypromising to take tough action if
inflation starts to increase. Centralbanks insulate decision makers from
political pressures by appointingthem for long terms, and a vaccine
purchase program could do the same.Appointing central bankers with
strong anti-inflationcredentials also helps build credibilityfor central
banks. Similarly, delegating decisionsregarding eligibility and pricing
to a committee whichincluded some members who hadworked in in-
dustry might help convince potentialvaccine developers that the com-
mittee would not imposeunreasonable conditionsafterthey
developed a vaccine.8
Commitments by the vaccinepurchase program will be morecredi-
ble if the program administratorshave incentives to build a reputation
for fulfilling promises. If the programcovered vaccines against several
diseases, program administratorswould have incentives to develop a
reputation for treating vaccinedevelopers fairly, so as to buildcredibil-
ity with potential developersof other vaccines.9 Nonetheless,it may
take time to develop a reputation.
One way to help build credibilitywith potential vaccine developers
would be to set a minimum price inadvance.'0 This could help solve
the time-consistency problem,but at some cost. A vaccinewhich is
useful, but not useful enough to warrantpurchase at the minimum
guaranteed price, would not bepurchased at all. In practice, how-
ever, this problem maynot be that serious. Most vaccinesthat passed
regulatory approval would becost-effective at even a high price
per personimmunized relative to the likelyavailability of funds
(Glennerster and Kremer 2000).This is because vaccines falling
far short of U.S. or Europeanregulatory requirements have great
difficulty winning wide approval indeveloping countries in any case.11
If one takes as given that vaccineswill only be used if they meet a strin-
gent risk-benefit ratio, it seemsquite unlikely that guaranteeing amini-
mum price ex antewould lead to rejection of anotherwise usable
vaccine on cost-effectivenessgrounds. If a vaccine were notuseful
enough to warrant purchase at a fewdollars per person immunized,
the cost of failing to purchase itwould not be that great. Moreover, if
a vaccine turned out tobe socially useful, but not goodenough to qual-
ify for purchase under the programat the promised price, thiswould
not preclude individualcountries from purchasing the vaccine orother
donors from purchasing it.The costs of guaranteeing a minimum
price seem small relative to thebenefit of improving the credibilityofNew Vaccine Markets II: DesignIssues
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commitments to reward vaccinedevelopers, and thusspurring research.
III.Copayments
Another way to increase themarket for vaccines would beto offer to match others' expenditureson vaccine purchases. This is similar,in ef- fect, to purchasing thevaccine and providing it to othersin exchange
for a copayment. Requiringcountries receiving vaccines toprovide rea-
sonable copaymentscan boost incentives for vaccinedevelopers given
any fixed level of donor contributions.Copayments also helpensure
that the authorities in recipientcountries feel that the vaccine issuit- able for use in their circumstances.This is important sinceconditions
vary among countries. For example,a vaccine might be effective against
the strains of malaria prevalentin some countries, butnot against other
strains. Finally, requiringcopayments is a useful test ofa country's
commitment to a program. Ifa country is prepared to makea copay-
ment, it is also more likely to beprepared to take the othersteps neces-
sary to ensure that the vaccine is deliveredto the people who need it.
Setting the level ofcopayments involves a trade-off betweenimprov- ing access oncea vaccine has been developed andcreating incentives
for vaccine development. Onthe one hand, oncea vaccine has been de-
veloped, it will be producedat the efficient scale if thecopayment
equals the marginal cost ofproducing an additional dose.On the other
hand, given a fixed level of donorcontributions, incentives forvaccine development will begreaterifdeveloping countriesprovide
copayments at their willingness topay for the vaccine.
Setting copayments fromcountries receiving vaccines justbelow their estimated willingnessto pay for vaccines willmaximize incen-
tives for vaccine developmentwhile not reducingconsumption of vac-
cines below the optimal level.Since richer countriesare likely to be
willing to pay more for vaccinesthan poorer countries, thisimplies that
copayments should rise withper capita income)2 Willingnessto pay
may also be greater for diseases thatcreate a particularly high health
burden, such as HIV/AIDS.Given the uncertainty inestimating this
willingness to pay and the need fora uniform copayment policyacross
heterogeneous countries, it makessense to estimate willingness topay
conservatively. Insisting on too greata copayment would limitaccess
to the vaccine, and, by reducingtake-up, would reduceincentives for vaccine developers.Kremer
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Note also that setting therequired copaymentS close tocountries'
willingness to pay reduces vaccinedevelopers' temptation to try to
extract supplemental paymentsfrom purchasing countries. Itis not
clear whether the vaccinepurchase program should agree tobe a party
to vaccine purchaseswith supplemental copaymentsgreater than
those required under the program, evenif the recipient country agrees
to this. Allowingsupplemental payments broadens the scopefor vac-
cine developers to demandprices greater than thoseoffered under the
vaccine purchase program,and these higher prices couldpotentially
exclude some countries from access tovaccines. For example, if the
vaccine developer felt that mostcountries would be willing tosupple-
ment the required copaymentby $1 a dose, it mightdemand this from
every country. Thosecountries unable to afford thissupplemental pay-
ment would not be able toobtain the vaccine.
Note that tying copayments toincome achieves many of thebenefits
of tiered pricing. If copayments areset appropriately access tovaccines
is expanded so that vaccines canbe used wherever thesocial value of
the vaccine exceeds themarginal production cost. Incentivesfor vac-
cine development cancorrespond to the aggregate willingnessto pay
for vaccines. Yet vaccinedevelopers need not take thepolitically dam-
aging step of revealing theirwillingness to produce additionaldoses at
low cost, thus risking generatingenhanced political pressures for price
regulation.
IV.Combining Technical Requirementsand a Market Test
Technical eligibility requirementscould potentially be combinedwith a
market test. For example,candidate vaccines could first berequired to
meet basic technical requirements1which would typically include
clearance by some regulatory agency(such as the U.S. FDA). They
could then be required to meet amarket testdeveloping countries
wishing to purchase vaccinesusing program resourceswould be re-
quired to contribute a copayment,and would be required todraw
down an account they wouldhave within the vaccinepurchase pro-
gram. Any vaccinesmeeting these requirementswould be eligible for
purchase at some base price.Vaccines exceeding these requirements
could potentially receive bonuspayments linked to vaccineeffective-
ness. Ideally, thiswould make commitments topurchase useful vac-
cines at remunerative pricescredible to potential vaccine developers,
but would leave enoughflexibility that appropriate purchasingdeci-New Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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sions could be made after vaccines hadbeen tested and their character-
istics became known.
Basic Technical Requirements
To be eligible for purchase,vaccines could be required to fulfillbasic
technical requirements, whichwould normally include regulatory
clearance by an established regulatoryagency, such as the U.S. FDA or
its European counterpart. Thiswould ensure that the fundswere spent
for bona fide vaccines, rather thanfor quack remedies. However,a vac-
cine may pass a risk-benefitassessment in one country, but not another.
For example, a malariaor tuberculosis vaccine with significant but
small side effects might not beappropriate for general use in lowprev-
alence countries, suchas the United States, but might save millions of
lives in high prevalenceareas.
It might make sense to allow theprogram, at its discretion, to waive
the requirement of regulatoryapproval in donor countries ifa country
requested the vaccine anda scientific committee established by the
program concurred that the vaccine satisfied therisk-benefit assess-
ment given the situation in the applicantcountry. More generally, it
might be appropriate toguarantee that any candidate vaccine satisfy-
ing certain high technical standardswould receive automatic approval
to go on to the market test. There couldalso be a gray area in which
candidate vaccines could be approvedat the discretion of a scientific
committee. This would provideassurance to potential vaccine devel-
opers that if they develop a high-quality vaccine,they will have a mar-
ket. It would also allow thecommittee the flexibility to consider
purchasing vaccines that passeda risk-benefit analysis, but fell short of
an ideal vaccine.
Just as a vaccine might satisfya risk-benefit assessment in a high
prevalence country, but not in theUnited States, it is possible thata
vaccine could be appropriate in theUnited States, but not elsewhere.
For example, a malaria vaccine thatinterfered with natural immunity
might be appropriate for U.S. travelers,who would not have builtup
this immunity in anycase, but not for long-term residents of malarious
areas. A few minimal technical requirementsbeyond regulatory ap-
proval are therefore likely to beappropriate before vaccineswere made
eligible for the market test describedbelow. Travelers' vaccines forma-
laria, which protect people makingshort trips, would presumably be
ineligible.13 Other technical requirementsmight include a requirement86
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that a vaccine could only bepurchased for a country if it had been
shown effective for the strainsof disease prevalent in that country. Vac-
cines requiring more than somecutoff number of doses to be effective
might require a special waiver foreligibility. Some ongoing monitoring
might be required, to ensure that resistanceto the vaccine had not de-
veloped and spread. However, thecredibility of purchase commit-
ments with potential vaccinedevelopers would be enhanced by
keeping technical eligibility requirementsbeyond regulatory clearance
minimal and clearly defined to reduce thepotential for abuse of discre-
tion. This would decentralize the basicpurchasing decision to individ-
ual recipient countries, Of course,these countries would be free to
consider recommendations put out bythe World Health Organization
or any other body.
The Market Test
As discussed above, vaccines could meetregulatory approval, but still
be unsuitable for widespread use in aparticular developing country.
For example, a vaccine that waseffective only if people received ten
precisely timed doses might be usefulfor the U.S. military, but not for
most people in developing countries.Requiring vaccines which satisfy
the technical criteria to meet amarket test would allow purchasers the
flexibility to make decisions aboutwhether a particular vaccine is ap-
propriate for their needs. In particular,developing countries would
have incentives to seriously considerthe suitability of candidate vac-
cines if they had to provide a copaymentand draw down an account
within the vaccine purchase programthat would be established spe-
cifically for each country.
Copayments help ensure that after aparticular vaccine has been
tested, it is considered worth purchasing.However, copayments alone
may not be sufficient todemonstrate country commitment, sincedo-
nors might offer tohelp fund copayments. It is not clearthat it would
be possible or desirable to prohibitthis.
Countries could be further motivated tocarefully consider their pur-
chases by establishing subaccountswithin the program for each coun-
try. If a country decided topurchase a vaccine, it would draw downthe
commitments allocated to it. This systemwould give countries an in-
centive to purchase a vaccine onlyif they were confident that it could
be effectively administered in theircountry and if they did not expect a
superior vaccine to come on themarket shortly. Otherwise, they would
be better off saving the funds intheir subaccount.New Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues 87
In the absence of separate subaccounts,countries might agree to pur-
chase even marginally effectivevaccines, knowing that if they didnot
consume the available funds, other countrieswould. If potential vac-
cine developers anticipated this, theymight invest in a candidatevac- cine that looked likeit would meet only minimaleligibility
requirements, rather than investing ina slightly more risky, but ulti-
mately much more promising, vaccine.If countries must spend funds
earmarked for their own vaccine purchases,they will have more incen-
tive to purchase only high qualityvaccines, thus providing incentives
for potential vaccine developersto focus on developing such vaccines.
Since countries would not be ableto use their accounts to purchase
anything but vaccines, and wouldnot receive interest on theiraccounts
if they remained unspent, they wouldhave every incentive touse their
accounts to purchase a good vaccine ifone were available.14
Relying only on a market test and eliminatingany technical require-
ments could potentially lead to the purchaseof inappropriate vaccines
due to bribery or tied deals. Vaccinedevelopers could offer to kick back
some percentage of the purchase price to the developingcountry in the
form of price reductionson other pharmaceuticals, or even bribes. This
could potentially be an attractivearrangement for the developing
country or its officials, since the country itselfwould contribute only a
copayment toward the cost of the vaccine,with the bulk of the
financing coming from the vaccinepurchase program.
A series of safeguardsare therefore needed to prevent purchase of in-
appropriate vaccines due to briberyor tied deals. The technical require-
ments for eligibility provide the first andmost important line of
defense. This would preventa country from using program funds to
purchase a quack vaccine manufactured bya politically connected
firm. Outright corruption couldprobably be limited with provisions
punishing firms found guilty of bribingofficials and restricting the
amount of travel, training, and other perksthat vaccine sellers could
provide to health ministry officials. Underthe U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, firms and executives foundguilty of bribing foreigngov-
ernments are subject to criminal prosecution.Other nations are now
adopting similar laws. Since the developingcountry vaccine market is
a small part of overall business for most largepharmaceutical compa-
nies, they would likely be reluctantto risk bad publicity, the attention
of regulators, and legal sanction in orderto make some extra moneyon
vaccines.
Whistle blower procedures could beinstituted to protect,or even re-
ward, committee members reportingattempts at bribery by vaccinedevelopers. Similarly, vaccinedevelopers could blow the whistle on
committee members who tried toinsist on kickbacks. Membersof the
committee who were proven tohave asked for kickbacks could be re-
moved from the committees.
Implicit tied dealings are moredifficult to regulate. A pharmaceuti-
cal firm simultaneously negotiatingwith a health ministry over a ma-
laria vaccine and an antibioticmight convey to the ministry that it
would be willing to be flexible onthe antibiotic price if the ministry
would purchase the malaria vaccine.In the absence of further incen-
tives, vaccine developers mighttherefore aim only at creating a vaccine
that could pass minimaleligibility requirements, rather than a more
widely useful vaccine.15
One way to limit corruption andtied deals, while still preserving a
market test, would be to includecivil society as well as governments in
countries' decision making processes.For example, the committee
making purchase decisions for a countrymight include not only repre-
sentatives of the Ministry ofHealth, but also respected physicians,
nongovernmental organization representatives,and scientists. Coun-
tries wishing to participate inthe program could be required to set up
such committees in advance, andmembers could have security of ten-
ure. Some members ofthe committee could be appointedby the vac-
cine purchase program. The committeecould have authority to release
resources from the country'ssubaccount within the program.The gov-
ernment would need to authorizedisbursements of public funds to
cover copayments, butdonors could potentially fundcopayments.
Limiting the number of dosespurchased for any one country would
limit the potential loss from tieddeals and corruption. The numberof
doses purchased for a countrymight be limited to the numberneeded
for the annual birth cohort, with someadjustment for the initial years
of the program when a backlogof unimmunized people wouldneed to
be vaccinated.
Bonus Payments Based on VaccineQuality
Specifying a minimum price whichwould be paid for vaccines meet-
ing the first twostepstechnical requirements and themarket test
would help provide potential developerswith a credible commit-
ment. However, it would bedesirable for developers to have incentives
to develop vaccines thatexceed a minimum eligibilitythreshold. It
might therefore be useful to providebonus payments depending on
vaccine quality. One standard way to measurecost-effectiveness in
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health is the cost of savinga Disability Adjusted Life Year,or DALY.
DALYs take into account not onlythe years of life lost but alsothe
years of disability caused by a disease. In orderto create appropriate
incentives for vaccine developersto develop high quality vaccines, bo-
nus payments could be set so as to tie thereward to the number of lives
or DALYs saved and to the cost of delivery
Bonuses could be provided forvaccines believed to exceeda cost-
effectiveness threshold, in dollarsspent per DALY averted. Ifa vaccine
exceeded this threshold,some fraction of the resulting savings couldbe
returned to the vaccine developeras a bonus above the base price.
Basing incentives on livesor DALYs saved would create good incen-
tives for pharmaceutical firmsto develop vaccines that createpositive
externalities, such as a malaria vaccinewith an altruistic component
which kills gametocytes, and thusprevents other people from becom-
ing infected. Any side effects ofa vaccine could be subtracted from the
measure of lives or DALYs saved.16
Bonuses could also be paid if thevaccine were cheap to deliver. This
would create incentives forresearchers to develop vaccines thatare
oral, rather than injectable, that donot require many doses, and that
can be delivered along with the vaccines currentlygiven as part of the
Expanded Program on Immunization(EPI).
Bonus payments could potentially beset in two ways. A committee
could be free to base bonuspayments directly on its estimates of the
number of lives or DALYs saved bya particular vaccine, using any data
it wished.17 Alternatively,a schedule of bonus payments could beset in
advance as a function ofmore easily measured vaccine characteristics,
such as efficacy in clinical trials, thenumber of doses needed, etc. An
approach such as that used by Glennersterand Kremer (2000) could be
extended to estimate the set of vaccinecharacteristics associated with
any particular cost-effectiveness threshold.
Directly estimating DALYsor lives saved after vaccinesare devel-
oped allows the program to considera broad range of vaccine charac-
teristics and to use up-to-date information,but it also createsmore
uncertainty for vaccine developers andraises the prospect of bias by
the committee charged withestimating DALYs and costs.18 Theappro-
priate strategy depends in parton how trustworthy the committee
charged with these tasks is consideredto be, and in part on whatrea-
sonably transparent and objectiveprocedures can be developed for
measuring vaccine efficacy. Thus, itmay vary among diseases.19
Basing payments directlyon the number of lives or DALYs saved
through a vaccine and the cost ofdelivery is also potentially problem-atic because these quantitiesdepend not only on actionsunder the
control of the vaccine developer,but also on actions by others.To the
extent that health ministries cannoteasily maintain cold chains orde-
liver vaccines to rural areas on aprecise schedule, vaccinations that re-
quire cold chains and preciselytimed deliveries will be expensive per
life orDALYsaved.
If the weaknesses of healthministries are not strategicallyaimed at
extracting payments from thevaccine developer, this will create appro-
priate incentives for vaccinedevelopers. Vaccine developersshould try
to design vaccines that areappropriate for actual health systems,not
for some theoretical ideal health system.For example, if health minis-
tries cannot maintain cold chainsfor vaccines, then vaccine developers
should have incentives to developheat stable vaccines.
However, to the extent that healthministries behave strategically, it
will be best to base bonus payments onpreset indicators of the likely
number ofDALYssaved, rather than the actualnumber ofDALYs.This
is because if vaccinedevelopers were paid based onrealizedDALYs
saved, health ministries couldpotentially try to extract payments
from the vaccine developer inexchange for agreeing todistribute
the vaccine efficiently. Thiswould weaken incentives forvaccine
development.
If the committee charged withestimating lives orDALYssaved sim-
ply makes honestmistakes in calculating thesequantities but those
mistakes do not systematicallytend to underestimate or overestimate
the actual effects of the vaccine,then the potential profit fromdevelop-
ing a vaccine could as easilybe increased or decreased bythe uncer-
tainty in calculations ofDALYsor lives saved.The attractiveness of
investment in vaccines wouldbe reduced, but only to theextent that
vaccine developers are not willingto take gambles that could turnout
to help them as easily as tohurt them.
Errors in estimation ofDALYsor lives saved areparticularly prob-
lematic if vaccine developers caninfluence these estimatesthrough ac-
tions other than research.For example, ifpolitically connected
pharmaceutical firms obtain morefavorableDALYcalculations, firms
will divert effort towards developingpolitical connections and away
from developing good vaccines.
The scope for bias would bereduced by setting forth procedures as
fully as possible ahead of time,working under a framework ofestab-
lishing a bonus per life orDALYsaved. The World HealthOrganization
project on the burden of diseasehas developed detailedprocedures for
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estimating DALY burdens.Epidemiological surveys could becon-
ducted to assess the burden ofvarious diseases prior to the develop-
ment of vaccines.
Sunset Provisions
Sunset provisions could beincorporated into a vaccine purchasepro-
gram. For example, a malaria vaccine fundcould revert to the donors
or be used for other health problems in developingcountries if after 50
years no qualifying vaccine had been developed,or if at some earlier
time a scientific committee establishedby the program determined that
the burden of malaria had beensustainably cut more than 50% through
other techniques, suchas insecticides. Sunset provisions couldbe con-
tinuous, so that the purchasecommitment would fall with theseverity
of the disease. Note thatany bonus payment basedon DALYs or lives
saved would automatically fallwith prevalence of the disease. Asunset
provision would increase the riskborne by potential vaccine develop-
ers, but biotech and pharmaceutical firmsroutinely have to bear the
risk that alternative technologieswifi render the projects theyare
working on superfluous. There isno reason why this should beany dif-
ferent for firms workingon developing country diseases. It is efficient
for researchers to consider thepossibility that their work will besuper-
seded by other technologies whenchoosing their research projects.
V.Procedures for Multiple Vaccines
For vaccine purchasecommitments to spur research, it isessential that
intellectual property rights berespected. If the program purchasesvac-
cines from imitators, rather thanrespecting the intellectualproperty
rights of the original developers,incentives for vaccine development
will be vitiated.20
However, enforcing patentsmay not be enough. Once one vaccine
for a disease has been developed,it becomes easier forcompetitors to
develop alternative vaccines,even if the first is protected bya patent,
as it can be relatively easy to designaround vaccine patents. Devel-
opers of the initial vaccine, therefore, facea risk that a marginally supe-
rior vaccine will be producedshortly after the initialvaccine is
developed and that this subsequentvaccine will capture the entire
market. This risk may deterresearch. In many industries, firstmover
advantages due to network effectsor to brand loyalty by customersareKremer
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as important aspatents in protecting innovations,but since govern-
ments are the main purchasersof vaccines, and are lesslikely to be
influenced by brand loyalty, otherforms of protection may beneeded
for vaccine developers.
It will be important to preserverewards for the initial developer,
who will have made the largestinvestment in research.Currently, the
world needs acceptablevaccines for malaria, tuberculosis,and
HIV/AIDS, and incentives for aprivate developer are a smallfraction
of the social value. Once anadequate vaccine is developed,however,
the world's need for asecond vaccine will be much morelimited. This
suggests a smaller rewardwill be needed to bring privateincentives for
a second vaccineinto line with the socialvalue of a second vaccine. To
some extent, theinitial developer will receive a largershare of vaccine
purchases in any case, since theinitial developer will sell vaccinesused
to immunize the backlogof unimmunized adults, whilesubsequent
developers will be restricted to themarket of new cohorts of children.
Pricing a vaccine in nominal termswill also disproportionatelyhelp
the original developer, sincereal prices will fall over time.(It would
even be possible tospecify a falling time path ofnominal prices.)
The developer of the firstvaccine could be furtherprotected through
an exclusivityclause similar to that inthe Orphan Drug Act. This
would require that the initialvaccine be purchased if neweralterna-
tives were not clinicallysuperior. This provision iswidely believed to
have greatly increasedresearch on orphan drugs (Shulmanand
Manocchia 1997).
In practice, the exceptionfor "clinically superior"vaccines may not
weaken incentives for the firstdeveloper that much, since regulatory
standards for approval of the firstvaccine are likely to be high,and it
may be difficult toshow that a subsequentvaccine is "clinically
superior."
Note that market exclusivitywould apply only to the targetpopula-
tion for which the originalvaccine was adequate. Thus, forexample, if
one firm develops anAIDS vaccine effective against aparticular dade
of the disease, it would havemarketing exclusivity for thatdade, but
not for other clades.
One potential objection to themarket exclusivity provision isthat it
could increase the risk borne bydevelopers. In the absence of amarket
exclusivity clause, if several firmsdevelop vaccines around the same
time, they will share themarket. Providing marketexclusivity to the
first vaccine developercould potentially increase risk.On the otherNew Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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hand, to the extent that prices fallif multiple vaccinesare invented, or
firms dissipate potential profitsin marketing expenditures,the ex-
pected reward to investing invaccine research and developmentis
greater with a market exclusivity clause.The success of the Orphan
Drug Act in increasing researchand development on orphandrugs
suggests that the increase in expectedprofits is the key issue forpoten-
tial developers. If itwere thought important to avoid increasingthe
risk borne by potential vaccinedevelopers, purchases under thepro-
gram could be limited to those vaccinesinvented within some period
(perhaps a year or two) followingthe licensing of the firstacceptable vaccine, unless a subsequentvaccine was clinically superior.This
would reduce risk for firmsengaged in a tight race to developa vac-
cine, while also reducing thechance that "me too" vaccineswould
greatly reduce sales for the initialdeveloper and thus deterresearch.
The exception in the OrphanDrug Act's market exclusivityprovi-
sion for clinically superiorproducts could potentially be modifiedfor
application to a vaccine purchasecommitment. Ideally, if a subsequent
vaccine were clinically superior, theprice paid would be relatedto the
marginal improvement the subsequentvaccine represents over the
original vaccine, and the originalvaccine developers would continue
to receive compensation in line withthe social value of their work.A
bonus payment system providesa potential mechanism for doing this.
One option would be to retain theexclusivity clause even ifa superior
vaccine were developed, but givethe developer of the originalvaccine
incentives to buy out the technologyof the second producer. The bonus
payments that would go with supplyinga superior vaccine would pro-
vide such an incentive. Alternatively,the newer vaccine could bepur-
chased at a price basedon its efficacy, but the developer of thenewer
vaccine could then be requiredto pay the original developeran
amount equal to the price paid for theoriginal vaccine, lessan allow-
ance related to the production cost of thenew vaccine. While this ap-
proach matches private and socialresearch incentives more closely
than the blanket exception forsuperior products in the OrphanDrug
Act, it would be difficultto administer.
VI.Vaccine Coverage and Pricing
This section first argues that the keydeterminant of researchincentives will be the total revenue generatedby a vaccine, rather than theprice
per person immunized. Decisions aboutwhere it is cost-effectivetoKremer
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vaccinate should be based onthe incremental cost ofmanufacturing an
additional unit of vaccine, ratherthan the average price paid per per-
son immunizedunder the program. Giventhe desired market size and
number of required vaccinations,the price per personimmunized can
be determined by dividingthe desired market sizeby the number of
people needing immunization.The tricky question isdetermining the
appropriate market size. Thetotal market promisedshould be large
enough to stimulate research,but not so large that a vaccinepurchase
program would not becost-effective. The second andthird subsections,
titled What Size Market IsNeeded to Spur Research? andCost-Effec-
tiveness, note that a roughrule of thumb in the industryis that a mar-
ket of $250 million per yearis necessary to spursignificant research,
and argue that a vaccinepurchase program would behighly cost-
effective even at a substantiallylarger scale. The sponsorof a vaccine
purchase commitment could startwith a modest program,which
would not be too expensive, butretain the option to increasethe value
of the program if the original programproved too small to stimulate
sufficient research. The fourthsubsection, titled Increasingthe Prom-
ised Vaccine Price over Time, arguesthat as long as the vaccineprice is
not expected to increase tooquickly, this will not lead vaccinedevelop-
ers to withhold avaccine from the market in thehope of getting a better
price.
Coverage
The key determinant ofresearch incentives will be thetotal discounted
revenue generated by avaccine. It is very expensive toconduct re-
search, but once research is complete,it is typically fairly cheap to pro-
duce additional doses. For afixed amount of total revenue,vaccine
developers will therefore bealmost as happy to produce ahigh volume
at a low price as alow volume at a high price.
This implies that, at least as afirst approximation, pricesshould be
set per personimmunized, not per dose. There islittle reason to pay
more per personimmunized if more doses arerequired to provide im-
munity than if a singledose is required. In fact, thevaccine is more
valuable if only a single dose isrequired to provide immunity asthis
reduces delivery costs and islikely to increase patient compliance.
Moreover, the vaccine purchaseprogram would not save moneyby
excluding large countries from coverage, orexcluding countries if vac-
cination is cost-effective atthe marginal cost of production,but not at
the average price paidfor vaccine under the program.This is a falseNew Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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economy, because potential vaccine developerswill need a fixed
amount of revenue to induce themto conduct research, and if fewer
doses are purchased, the priceper person immunized will need to be
greater to induce the same amount ofresearch.21
Given the quantity of vaccines likelyto be needed, the priceper im-
munized person should be setso as to yield the desired market size.
Market size should be largeenough to stimulate research ifscien-
tifically warranted, but notso large that a vaccine would not be
cost-effective.
What Size Market Is Neededto Spur Research?
There is no single answer to thequestion of how large a market is
needed to spur research. The largerthe market for a vaccine, themore
firms will enter the field, themore research leads each firm willpursue,
and the faster a vaccine will bedeveloped. The more researchersenter-
ing the field, the smaller the chancethat any particular firm will be the
first to develop a vaccine. Thusthe cost of development, adjustedby
the risk that a particular firmor research team will not win the devel-
opment race, rises with the potential sizeof the market. Given theenor-
mous burden of malaria, tuberculosis, andHIV/AIDS, it is important
to provide sufficient incentive formany researchers to enter the field
and to induce major pharmaceuticalfirms to pursue severalpotential
leads simultaneouslyso that vaccines can be developed quickly.
Because potential vaccine developersknow that their researchmay
fail, in order to have incentivesto conduct this work, theymust expect
to more than cover their researchexpenses if they succeed. For exam-
ple, if potential biotechnologyinvestors expect that a candidatevaccine
has a I in 10 chance of succeeding,they would require at leasta tenfold
return on their investment in thecase of success to make the invest-
ment worthwhjle.22
There are severalways to get a sense of the minimummarket size
needed to motivate investors.DiMasi et al. (1991), whoexamined 93
randomly selectednew chemical entities from asurvey of 12 pharma-
ceutical firms and found that, takinginto account the risk of failureat
each stage in the drug developmentprocess, the average cost per ap-
proved New Chemical Entity (NCE)was $114 million 1987 dollars.
Capitalizing this to the date ofmarketing approval ata (probably over-
generous) 8% discount rate impliesan average cost of $214 million 1987
dollars, or approximately $313million 1999 dollars. While this figureis
of some interest, there is widevariation in the cost of developing96
pharmaceuticals. DiMasi foundthat for most stages in thevaccine
development process, the standarddeviation of cost was greaterthan
the mean cost. Vaccine trialsfor diseases with low incidence,such as
HIV and tuberculosis, require verylarge samples, and aretherefore
expensive.23
The cost of developing malaria,tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines may be
much higher than suggestedby these estimates, since surveysof exist-
ing drugs and vaccines aredisproportionately likely to focus onthe
low hanging fruit of entitiesthat are cheap to develop.Unfortunately,
vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis,and HIV may not be such low hang-
ing fruit.
Itis also useful to considerthe revenue streamswhich seem
sufficient to induce vaccineresearch in developed countries.The new
Varivax vaccine againstchickenpox is expected to averageabout $177
million in annual revenue forthe first 7 years of its sales(Merck An-
nual Report 1998).
One approach to estimatingthe necessary size of a programis to ask
pharmaceutical executives whether avaccine purchase programcould
serve as an importantincentive for research, and howbig the program
would need to be to do so. There areseveral reasons why this approach
may give misleadingresults. First, the question ismisspecified. As dis-
cussed above, firms must decide notmerely whether to invest indevel-
oping a particular vaccine,but also at what level to invest.The more
lucrative a market, the moreleads they will pursue. Second,pharma-
ceutical executives may see thequestion as part of a pricenegotiation,
and may therefore inflate theirestimates, particularly if theyexpect
that budgets are likely to be cutin a process of negotiation.Third, phar-
maceutical firms may well request programsthat increase their profits,
without necessarily increasingtheir incentives to develop a new vac-
cine. In particular1pharmaceutical executives may claimthat the most
useful motivator for HIV vaccineresearch would be higher prices on
existing vaccines. Pharmaceuticalexecutives clearly have an incentive
to claim this, whether ornot it is the case. Fourth,pharmaceutical firms
have been criticized forfailing to invest in research onvaccines for dis-
eases that kill millionsof people, while investing in morecommercially
viable drugs (Silverstein 1999).This may make executives reluctantto
admit that they are not investingin vaccines because they thinksuch
vaccines would not beprofitable. It is more politicallyacceptable for
executives to say that they are notinvesting because they see fewscien-
tific prospects for such avaccine. Finally, the key decisionmakers are
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not just pharmaceutical firms, but alsobiotech firms and their potential
investors. Scientists workingon vaccines may not have even consid-
ered the possibility of starting biotechfirms or seeking investors, but if
a large market were expected for vaccines, theymight start thinking
about this. Given that they probablyhave not spent that much time
thinking about these issuesyet, their responses to questionsmay not be
that informative.
The opinion of outsiders familiarwith the industry but not part of it
may be somewhat more credible. A respectedpharmaceutical consult-
ing firm estimates thata $250 million annual market is neededto moti-
vate pharmaceutical firms (Whitehead1999). A 10 year purchase
commitment would likely be sufficientto motivate research, given that
potential vaccine developersare likely to heavily discount sales after
this period, and that competingvaccines are likely toemerge after 10
years ir any case, and drive down pricesto the point at which they
could be more broadly affordable.24A condition of participation in the
program could be agreement to license the vaccinesto producers in de-
veloping countries after 10years of purchases at an appropriate level.
If politicians are unwilling toassume liability for more than a fixed
amount of potential expenditure,coverage under the program could be
capped. For example,suppose that a $250 million annual marketwas
deemed necessary to spur seriousresearch on each vaccine, but that
political leaders were unwillingto commit to more than $520 millionin
potential annual expenditureson new vaccines. Suppose also that the
chance that malaria, HIV, andtuberculosis vaccines were all developed
simultaneously was judged to be less than10%. Instead of only cover-
ing vaccines for two diseases,an alternative approach would be to
pledge $260 million in annual purchasesfor vaccines for any of the dis-
eases, subject to a $520 million cap on totalcommitted annual expendi-
tures. In the unlikely case thatvaccines for three diseaseswere
developed simultaneously, purchasesforeach would average
one-third of $520 million or $173million. The expected market fora
vaccine developer would be 0.9 X $260 million+ 0.1 X $173 million,or
$251.3 million.
Cost-Effectiveness
While the need to motivate researchsets a lower bound on the size of
the purchase commitment, theneed for the program to becost-effective
when compared to alternativehealth interventions setsan upper98
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bound on the size of a purchase commitment.This section argues that
given the level of fundingwhich is likely to be forthcoming, this is un-
likely to prove a serious constraint.The World Bank has defined health
interventions that cost less than$100/DALY saved as highly cost-
effective (World Bank 1993). A programto purchase vaccines for ma-
laria, tuberculosis, and HIVwould be one of the most cost-effective
health interventions in the world.
Glennerster and Kremer (2000) considerpreliminary estimates of the
cost-effectiveness of commitments topurchase vaccines at various
funding levels, vaccine efficacy levels,and required numbers of doses.
We focus on a base case of an80% effective one-dose vaccine that
could be delivered with the EPIpackage. The average annual market is
taken to be $336 million for eachvaccine, with donors contributing ap-
proximately $250 million annually,and copayments providing the re-
mainder. The DALY burden of malaria,tuberculosis, and HIV is taken
from the World Health Report(WHO 1999a). We assume coverage
rates of 75% for targeted newcohorts, 50% for young childrenand
pregnant women, and 30% forother existing cohorts. Marginal deliv-
ery costs areassumed to be $1, $3, and $5 for these groups.
We find that in the first 10 yearsof the program, it would be cost-
effective to vaccinate approximately600 million people against ma-
laria, 1.7 billion against tuberculosis,and I billion people against HIV.
The net present value of expenditures perdiscounted DALY saved
over a 10 year horizonwould be $18 for malaria, $33 fortuberculosis,
and $10 for AIDS, includingdelivery costs. However, the benefitsof
the program will continuebeyond the 10 year life of the purchase com-
mitment, as competing vaccines appearand prices fall. With competi-
tion the price of the vaccine islikely to fall to a level which isaffordable
for governments and agencies such asUNICEF. The long run net pres-
ent value of expenditures perdiscounted DALY saved would be $9 for
malaria, $21 for tuberculosis, and$5 for AIDS. Overall, the costwould
be about $10/DALY. Thesenumbers are very rough and shouldsimply
be taken as indicating ordersof magnitude, but they do suggestthat
vaccine purchases would behighly cost-effective relative to the$100
per DALY World Bankthreshold. Dividing the $336 millionannual
market by the required number ofdoses yields a vaccine price per per-
son immunized in thefirst 10 years of $5.38 for malaria,$2.03 for tuber-
culosis, and $3.43 for HIV.
Purchase commitments would remaincost-effective under a range of
alternate assumptions about vaccineefficacy, the number of vaccine
doses required, and the sizeof the fund. In particular, even ifvaccineNew Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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efficacy were only 30%, immunizationcoverage for new cohorts was
only 50% rather than 75%, theoverall fund size was $500 millionper
disease per year, or three doseswere needed, the program wouldre-
main cost-effective.
These estimatesare likely to be conservative,as we have not taken
into account some important butdifficult to quantify effects. (1) Immu-
nization programs are likelyto reduce secondary infections,particu- larly for HIV and tuberculosis.(2) We have assumed thatthe
population and prevalence of thediseases are at steady state. Giventhe
fixed costs of research anddevelopment, population growthwill tend
to reduce the price per immunizationand the cost-effectiveness of the
program. (3) HIV prevalence is growing, whichwould lower the cost of
the program per DALY saved.(4) It is possible that with widespread
immunization, the diseases would beeradicated, at least insome re-
gions. In this case the benefits of theprogram would continue, while
the delivery and manufacturingcosts would fall. (5) We have neglected
benefits flowing to richcountries, which are important forHIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis. (6) We haveassumed reasonably highmanufacturing
and delivery costs. (7) We havenot allowed for any targeting ofvaccine
delivery to areas of particularlyhigh prevalence withincountries,
which would improvecost-effectiveness.
Increasing the Promised VaccinePrice over Time
The sponsor of a vaccine purchasecommitment program could start
with a relatively modestprogram. If additional incentiveswere judged
necessary to spur vaccine research, thepromised price could be in-
creased until a vaccinewere developed or the price reached thesocial
value of a vaccine.25 Thisprocedure mimics auctions, whichare typi-
cally efficient procurementmechanisms in situations in whichproduc-
tion costs are unknown.26
As long as the price promised fora vaccine does not increase at a rate
greater than the interest rate, firms willnot have an incentive to siton a
vaccine they have developed whilewaiting for the price to rise. Tosee
this, note that a firm that delaysselling a vaccine postpones itsreturns
into the future, and therefore hasto discount these returns at the inter-
est rate. In addition, delay risks thepossibility that a competitor willin-
troduce an alternative vaccine.Finally, if the vaccine developerhas
already taken out a patent, delayuses up the patent life.
If the price promised to vaccinedevelopers were increased, thisin-
crease could potentially be restricted tovaccines which were basedonpatents that had not yet beentaken out. Greater incentives may notbe
needed to stimulate the final stagesof research on a candidate vaccine
that is already promising. Moreover,restricting price increases to vac-
cines based on new patentsreduces the chance that firmswill withhold
a product from themarket in the hope that priceswill increase. Phar-
maceutical firms are not likely to riskdelaying patent applications for
fear that a competitor will preemptthem, especially since there are po-
tentially many competing biotechfirms that could patent vaccines,
whereas only a few largepharmaceutical firms actually conductclini-
cal trials and manufacturevaccines.27 As discussed in the appendix, in-
creasing the price over time mayinduce firms to delay startingresearch
on a vaccine, orslow down the pace of thisresearch, but this strategic
delay will not be severe if manyfirms can potentially compete tode-
velop a vaccine. Moreover, whilevaccine trials could not beconducted
secretly, research toward patentscould be, and this would make it
much more difficult for potentialvaccine developers to collude to in-
crease the price bydelay.
The appendix uses techniquesfrom the economic theory of auctions
to examine the effect of increasesin price on vaccine development.The
main results are as follows: Ifthere are many competing firms, asystem
in which the price starts lowand rises over time will generate avaccine
at close to the lowest possiblecost. The fewer competingresearchers,
the longer each waits beforebeginning vaccine research. The greater
the initial price, the morerapidly a vaccine will be developed.This im-
plies that if society values a vaccinehighly, it should choose a highini-
tial price, and thus be willing toincur the risk of paying morethan the
minimum cost necessary to spurvaccine development. In the most re-
alistic case, increasing thegrowth rate of the price will speedvaccine
development unless very few firmscould potentially compete to de-
velop the vaccine.
VII.The Scope of a Purchase Commitment
Potentially, advance purchase commitmentscould be used to encour-
age research not only onvaccines, but also on other techniquesfor
fighting disease, including drugs,diagnostic devices, and insecticides
against the mosquitoes thattransmit malaria.
Covering a range of technologieswould avoid biasing research effort
toward vaccines, rather than othertechnologies to fight disease. The
example of the British government'sprize for a method of determining
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longitude suggests that prizeterms should be set so as to admita vari-
ety of solutions. Most of the scientificcommunity believed that longi-
hide could best be determined throughastronomical observations,
whereas the actual solutionwas through development of a sufficiently
accurate clock. Prespecifyingan astronomical solution would have
been a mistake.
On the other hand, openingup the program to any method of
fighting disease would make definingeligibility and pricing decisions
almost impossible. For example,developers of new HIV counseling
techniques could seek to obtainpayments for new techniques forpro-
moting safe sex. Resources would bewasted in disputes over the im-
pact of such programs. If only vaccines formalaria, tuberculosis, and
HP! were eligible, theresources wasted on administration andon at-
tempts to influence the committee wouldlikely be fairly small relative
to the cost of developinga vaccine, since only those who had actually
developed a vaccine would havean entry ticket to begin trying to
influence the disposition ofprogram funds. One factor that militates to-
ward restricting theprogram to vaccines and drugs is that existingin-
stitutions, such as the U.S. FDA,already have a reputation for
adjudicating safety and efficacy ofvaccines and drugs. A safe, environ-
mentally appropriate insecticidemight be an excellent way to fightma-
laria, but a whole set of procedureswould need to be developed to
determine eligibility standards forinsecticides. This suggests thatre-
search on insecticide might be bettersupported through push
programs.
In principle, purchase commitmentsare appropriate for both drugs
and vaccines, but ifa choice has to be made for budgetaryreasons, vac-
cines are probably a slightly higherpriority, since distortions in vaccine
markets are more severe. Since drugsare much more susceptible than
vaccines to the spread of resistance, individualdecisions to take drugs
may potentially create negative, as wellas positive, externalities. More-
over, drugs are widely considered to bemore profitable than vaccines,
perhaps because consumersare reluctant to spend on vaccines for ei-
ther behavioral or learningreasons.
Table 3.1 shows the number of deathscaused annually by various
diseases for which vaccinesare needed. Given a sufficient budget, it
might be appropriate to commit in advanceto purchase vaccines devel-
oped against any of these diseases.However, if funding is tightly
limited, it may be appropriateto target the most deadly diseases.
An alternative option would beto start with some easier-to-developTable 3.1
Deaths from Disease for which VaccinesAre Needed
Estimated, World Health Report (WHO 1999a).
bA pneumococcus vaccine was just approved for use in theUnited States, but it needs to
be tested in developing countries,and perhaps modified accordingly.
cThe Jordan Report (NIAD 1998).
dR Berquist, WHO, personal communication.
Source: Children's Vaccine Initiative.1999, July. CVI Forum 18: 6.
vaccines and drugs as a wayof building credibility. It also maybe use-
ful to first experiment withpurchase commitments for a fewvaccines
or drugs and thenconsider modifying or extendingthe program based
on the resultingexperience.
VIII.Conclusion
For a vaccine purchase commitmentto stimulate research investment,
it must provide a crediblepromise that developers of goodvaccines
will be rewarded. Eligibility requirementscould include both minimal
technical standards and the markettest that developing countriesbe
willing to provide a copaymentfor the vaccine. To provide incentives
for development of high qualityvaccines, bonus payments for vaccines
could be tied, directly orindirectly, to the number of lives orDALYs
saved by the vaccine, and to thedelivery cost. The developer ofthe first
viable vaccine could have marketexclusivity unless subsequent vac-
cines are clinically superior.The vaccine price promised perimmu-
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Chagas disease 17 0.20
Dengue 15 0.18
Leprosy 2 0.02
Total deaths 8319 100.00
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nized child could initially be setat a modest level, and could then be
raised if it proved insufficient tospur enough research.
This conclusion briefly discussesthe politics surrounding vaccine
purchase programs. It then discussesthe proposed U.S. tax credit
forqualifyingvaccinesales and theproposed World Bank
$1 billion fund for purchasingvaccines for future diseases. Finally, it
discusses how a private foundationcould implement a vaccinepur-
chase commitment.
The Politics of Creating Markets forVaccines
Those with a stake in current aidprograms and in grant funded re-
search programs may object to pullprograms designed to create mar-
kets for vaccines, if they fear thatresources would be drawn from
important existing initiatives. Organizationsinvolved in efforts to en-
courage condom use, for example, may fear thatfunds to develop an
AIDS vaccine would be drawn fromprevention efforts. Academic and
government scientists working on HIV researchmay be concerned that
a vaccine purchase program may result incuts in other important re-
search programs. Thesegroups are well placed to affect the political
decision-making process.
Conflict between the need forincentives to develop new vaccines
and existing prevention and researchefforts will be limited ifa pur-
chase commitment is financed frompledges rather than current bud-
gets. When a vaccine became available, itmight be seen as justifying
increasing the total aid budget. Alternatively,once a vaccine became
available, some existing prevention effortsmay be less cost-effective,
and budget savings will be possible.The prospect of these futurecuts
will be politically easier than cuttingexisting programs, as future aid
budgets do not have as much constituencyamong aid workers as cur-
rent aid budgets. The people currentlypromoting condom use orre-
searching HIV may have retiredor gone on to other jobs by the time an
HIV vaccine has been developed. Itis worth noting that the budgetary
conflict between researchon new vaccines and efforts to control dis-
ease using existing technologies is sharper if researchis financed out of
current budgets, as it would be in pushprograms, than if it is financed
through future vaccine purchases,which would come out of future
budgets.
At least in the U.S. Congress, pharmaceuticalfirms are also likely to
be a key player in discussions of howto encourage vaccine research104
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and development. Pharmaceuticalfirms will be interested in seeing
some expenditure earlyin the program. This may be in partbecause
such expenditures would enhancethe credibility of the commitment,
and in part because a programrewarding, say, a malaria vaccine,
would not necessarily yield highexpected profits, since much of the
profit would be dissipated incompetition to develop the vaccine. It
may be easier tofind champions for such programs inthe pharmaceu-
tical industry if some portion ofthe funds can be used to cover vaccines
which are closer to development. Inparticular, several new pneumo-
coccus vaccines areexpected to be developed soon.Additional work
will be needed to test the suitabilityof these vaccines for developing
countries, and perhaps tomodify them to reflect the strains of
pneumococcus prevalent there.As currently written, the U.S. adminis-
tration's proposal would cover new pneumococcUSvaccines, since the
disease kills more than a millionpeople each year. Note, however, that
one vaccine for pneumococcUshas been licensed recently, and that un-
der the administration's proposal, thisparticular vaccine would not be
eligible, since it was developed beforethe legislation was passed.
Potential Sponsors of New Markets forVaccines
Commitments to purchase vaccinescould be undertaken by govern-
ments of industrialized countries,the World Bank, or private founda-
tions. One institution couldestablish the basic infrastructure for a
program and make aninitial pledge and other organizationscould
later make pledges of their own.The initial pledge could cover particu-
lar diseases or countries, with laterpledges broadening the program.
Nations might not want to pledge to avaccine purchase commitment
program operated underanother donor nation's control, so itmight
make sense to build in proceduresfor representation of multiple do-
nors on decision-makingbodies at the start, even if the program were
initially supported by only one or twodonors.
The U.S. administration's 2000budget proposal (availableat
http: //www.treas.gov/taxpOlicy/libralY/ grnbkOo.pdf) included $1
billion in tax credits on vaccine sales overthe 2002-2010 period. The
program would match everydollar of qualifying vaccine saleswith a
dollar of tax credit, effectively doublingthe incentive to develop vac-
cines for neglected diseases.Qualifying vaccines would have to cover
infectious diseases which kill at least onemillion people each year,
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Secretary of the Treasury after advice fromthe U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development. To qualify for thetax credit, sales would have to
be made to approved purchasing institutions,such as UNICEF. Al-
though the President's proposal isstructured as a tax credit, it would
have effects similar toan expenditure program that matched private
funds spent on vaccines. The administration'sproposal could help cat-
alyze other funds for vaccine purchases,since it matches such pur-
chases dollar for dollar.
The details of which vaccine sales wouldqualify would be worked
out by the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (TJSAID) under
the program, and the analysis in thispaper suggests that the details of
their procedures will be quite importantfor the effect of the program.
Biotech and pharmaceutical firmsare more likely to find the commit-
ment credible if, once the tax credit legislationis passed, USAID
quickly specifies guidelines for how it willallocate credits. In particu-
lar, TJSAID would need to specify howit will address issues of vaccine
pricing (presumably, it would notapprove credit allocations for a small
quantity of vaccine sold at tens of thousands ofdollars per person im-
munized); how much of the fund could bespent on a vaccine that is
currently far along in research, suchas the pneumococcus vaccine; and
what procedures would be usedto allocate credits if multiple versions
of a vaccine were available.
The World Bank president, James Wolfensohn,recently said that the
institution plans to createa $1 billion loan fund to help countriespur-
chase specified vaccines if and when theyare developed (Financial
Times 2000). Glennerster and Kremer (2000)discuss this proposal in
more detail. The Bank has yet to take actionon this. One option under
consideration is a more generalprogram to combat communicable dis-
eases of the poor. For a general program to stimulateresearch, it must
include an explicit commitment to helpfinance the purchase ofnew
vaccines if and when theyare developed. Without an explicit commit-
ment along the lines proposed by Wolfensohn,it is unlikely that the
large scale investments needed to developvaccines will be undertaken.
As discussed in the companionpaper, increased coverage of existing
vaccines, while desirable in itsown right, will by itself be inadequate to
convince potential vaccine developers that therewill be a market for
new vaccines when they are developed, given the longlead times for
vaccines and the fickleness of donor interest.
An explicit commitment to help financepurchases of new vaccines
will not interfere with other initiativesto tackle communicable diseases106
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of the poor. This is because the commitmentdoes not have to be
financed unless and until a vaccine isdeveloped. So, for example, the
Bank could increase lending to promotethe use of bednets against ma-
laria, or increase coverage of existingvaccines, while committing that if
and when new vaccines are developed,it will provide loans to coun-
tries purchasing these vaccines.
Some within the Bank have traditionallyregarded earmarking future
credits for a particular purpose asundesirable because it reduces the
flexibility of the Bank to provide loanswhere they would achieve the
greatest benefit. Sacrificing flexibilityis a mistake when it brings no
compensating advantage. However, earmarking canbe justified as a re-
sponse to time consistencyproblems. In particular, in the case of vac-
cines, earmarking can helpresolve the time consistency problem
inherent in convincing potential vaccinedevelopers that governments
will compensate them adequately oncethey have sunk funds into de-
veloping vaccines. The loss of flexibilityassociated with earmarking
does not seem like a major problem, sinceit would be hard to imagine a
situation in which purchasing vaccinesfor malaria, tuberculosis, and
AIDS would not be cost-effective. In any case, acommitment could be
structured so that it would be triggered onlyif a vaccine satisfied a par-
ticular cost-effectiveness threshold.
For countries to have an incentive toparticipate in the proposed
World Bank program, loans will need tobe at the concessional Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) rates,and must not simply sub-
stitute for other concessional loanscountries would have received. This
is because commitments by one countryto purchase vaccines benefit
other countries by encouraging vaccineresearch and development. No
one country, therefore, has asufficient incentive to make a commitment
on its own (the globalpublic good problem).
Private foundations could also play amajor role in creating markets
for new vaccines. Foundations mayfind it easier than governments to
credibly commit to future vaccine purchases,given their greater conti-
nuity of leadership. In particular, theGates Foundation has $22 billion
in assets, and one of its main prioritiesis children's health in develop-
ing countries, and vaccines inparticular. U.S. law requires private
foundations to spend at least 5% of their assetsannually. This suggests
a way that pushand pull incentives for vaccine developmentcould be
combined. A U.S. foundation could spend 5%of its assets annually on
grants to help expand the use of existingvaccines and provide for vac-
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in encouraging vaccine research, simplyby pledging that if a vaccine
were actually developed, the foundation wouldpurchase and distrib-
ute it in developing countries.
Appendix: The Effect of Increasingthe Promised Price for Vaccines
This appendix analyzes the effects ofincreasing the price pledged fora
vaccine under the simplest model ofauctions, in which each firm hasa
private cost of developinga vaccine, and these costs are independent.
Suppose that the cost of developinga vaccine for pharmaceutical firm i,
denoted c, is independently drawnfrom a distribution F withupper
support and that there are N symmetricalpharmaceutical firms. Sup-
pose the price p starts at some valuep<15and then grows, or isex-
pected on average to grow, ata constant rate until a vaccine is invented,
or until p reaches
15.
An equilibrium consists ofa function p(c) mapping each firm's cost
into a price at which it will developa vaccine. A necessary first order
condition forj(Cj) to be privately optimal is that thegrowth rate of sur-
plus, Pi - c1, must equal the discountrate plus the hazard rate thata ri-
val firm will develop the vaccine. In thesimplest case, in which bidders
are symmetric and the cost of developinga vaccine is not correlated
among bidders, p, increases monotonically withc. Given monotonicity,
the hazard rate thata rival will enter depends on the probability thata
rival firm has a cost slightlygreater than c1 conditionalon no firm hav-
ing a cost less than c. As the numberof firms grows, p1(c1) declines,as-
ymptotically approachingc1, and the hazard rate that a rival enters
grows without bound. Thus, if therewere many symmetric pharma-
ceutical firms, this auction mechanismwould lead a vaccine to be de-
veloped at a price very close to thecost of its development. Increasing
the number of bidders not only reducesthe expected price, but alsore-
duces the expected time untila vaccine is developed given F and the
growth rate of p.
At least over some range, increasing thegrowth rate of p. takingp as
fixed, will speed the time untila vaccine is developed. This is despite
the fact that the first order conditionimplies that the faster the growth
rate of p. or equivalently the lower thediscount rate, the greaterPi(Ci).
To see why increasing the growthrate of p speeds the auction, note that
if the growth rate ofp is infinite, then the auction concludes immedi-
ately because the price immediatelyattains its upper limit of
15.As the
growth rate of p approacheszero, the expected time for the auction to108
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conclude grows without bound. Moreover,reducing the growth rate of
p must asymptoticallyincrease the time until a vaccine isdeveloped,
since as /p approaches zero,p1(C1) approaches its lower bound of c,and
hence as the growth rate slows,the reduction iniis bounded, whereas
the time it takes for the auction toreach any particular price increases
without bound as the auction slows.
It seems likely that the expected timeuntil a vaccine is produced typ-
ically declines with the growth rateof p. given p. but if there are few
firms, it is possible to constructexamples in which the expected time
until a vaccine is produced increaseswith the growth rate of p. If there
are many firms, thenp1(c1) will be very close to c1, and hencereducing
the growth rate of p will havelittle effect on p1(c1), but will stilllengthen
the time required to reach anyprice. Hence, with many firms, arapidly
growing price, given p, is likely tolead to a much faster vaccine discov-
ery. On the other hand,if there are only a small numberof firms, then
p1(C1) may be significantly greaterthan c, and reducing pi(Ci) may
significantly shorten the auction.Consider the extreme case with only
one firm. If p growsrapidly enough, the bidder willprefer to wait until
the end of the auction, whenthe price reaches,before developing a
vaccine. On the other hand,if the growth rate of the price is lessthan
the interest rate, then once p/C1 is greatenough, the vaccine will be de-
veloped. Thus, at least for somerealizations of c, increases in the
growth rate of p can lengthen the timeuntil a vaccine is developed. If
the distribution of the cost ofdevelopment is such that most ofthe
mass is at a low level,but there is a thin tail reaching up to,then in-
creases in the growth rateof p can lengthen the expectedtime until a
vaccine is developed.
Holding constant and the growthrate of the price, the higher p.the
shorter the time until a vaccine isdeveloped. This suggests that the
more a vaccine isvalued, the greater p should be. In theextreme, if the
social value of the vaccine is far greaterthan the upper support of c,
then it would make sense to eitherhave the price rise very quickly, or
to choose p close to. Some mayfeel that the social value of vaccinesis
so great that it isbetter to spend more money than torisk delay, but this
does not seem to be therevealed preference of rich country
governments.
As long as the price does not growthat much faster than the interest
rate, pharmaceutical firmswill not actually sit on a vaccinethey had al-
ready developed, waiting forthe price to rise. Given discounting,it
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first incur the cost of developinga vaccine, and then sit on the vaccine.
Even if the firm got lucky and developeda vaccine faster than it ex-
pected, it would not sit on it if the growthrate of the program were
equal to or less than the discount rate. Oncea vaccine is developed, the
opportunity cost of losing out to another bidder isnot p - c, but rather
p. The firm would only wait to develop the vaccine if the growthrate of
p exceeded the discount rate plus the hazard rate that another firm
would develop a vaccine.28
The optimal initial price dependson the expected cost of developing
the vaccine, and therefore would genericallydiffer between diseases.
To see this, consider a hypothetical examplein which each pharmaceu-
tical firm faces its own cost of developinga vaccine, but it is common
knowledge that the cost of developinga malaria vaccine is such that re-
search would be profitable at between $5 and$6 per person immu-
nized, while the cost of developingan HIV vaccine is such that research
would be profitable at between $15 and $16per person immunized.
Starting the auction at more than $6per person immunized would pro-
vide unnecessary rents to developers ofa malaria vaccine. Starting the
auction at less than $15 per person immunizedwould unnecessarily
delay the development of an HIV vaccine.
The analysis above treats the cost of developinga vaccine as inde-
pendently distributed across bidders, but inpractice, there are almost
certainly common components to this cost, andto the benefits of selling
a vaccine to the program. This will create some tendency towarda win-
ner's curse. Firms might try to publicizeany leads in research in order
to deter rivals. This is a general feature of patentraces, and is not spe-
cific to this mechanism. Since developinga vaccine involves many
stages of research, and promising vaccinescan fail at any stage from
laboratory tests to animal trials to Phase 4 humantrials, potential rivals
are unlikely to believe that the leader has a lockon becoming the first to
develop a vaccine.29
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The credibility of the vaccine purchase commitment canbe increased by framing it as
a unilateral contract (i.e., one notrequiring a promise by others to become valid) and ex-
plicitly including a promise not to revoke. Someadditional legal issues might arise if a
purchase commitment were made by a national government or aninternational institu-
tion, and legal research would be needed to addressthese issues.
Sobel (1995) argues that the longitude prize committee wasbiased toward an astro-
nomical solution and insisted on improvements andmultiple trials, creating repeated de-
lays, until the king intervened on behalf of thechronometer's inventor. Note, however,
that this account is disputed. The economic historianPaul David argues that the condi-
tions imposed by the committee were reasonable(personal communication 2000). In any
case, this points to the importanceof program rules and adjudication procedures in
influencing credibility of purchase commitments.
For example, consider a simple case in which potentialvaccine developers seek to
maximize expected profits and accurately interpretthe degree of commitment entered
into by potential donors. Suppose that in the absenceof a particular piece of contractual
language in the vaccine purchase commitment, there is a90 percent chance the sponsor
purchases the vaccine at the promised price and a 10 percentchance that they renege and
renegotiate to a price of half the level originallypromised. In this case, in the absence of a
contractual arrangement, firms which seek to maximizeexpected profits will act as if the
value of the program is not the promised annual revenuefrom the program, but rather 95
percent of the promised annual revenue. Note thatwhile the expected incentive is only
95 percent of the promised level, so is the expected costto the sponsor. To the extent that
both vaccine developers and the sponsor arerisk averse, they would both prefer a per-
fectly credible commitment of $950 million to a 90 percentchance of $1 billion and a 10
percent chance of a $500 million payment. Inthis sense, imperfect credibility reduces the
efficiency of purchase commitments.
Some have speculated about the possibility of analtruistic malaria vaccine, which
would block further transmission of the disease, withoutprotecting the person who
takes the vaccine. It is unclear how many peoplewould be willing to take such a vaccine.
Moreover, given the high intensity of malaria transmissionin many parts of Africa, the
epidemiological impact of an altruistic vaccine might be quitesmall unless the vaccina-
tion rate was very high. Committing in advance topurchase such a vaccine would be
difficult.
Glennerster and Kremer (2000) examine the cost-effectivenessof vaccines with differ-
ent degrees of efficacy requiring differentnumbers of doses, and providing different
lengths of protection. In future work, we plan to extendthis analysis to examine how eli-
gibility standards could be established so that vaccineswould be eligible if they meet a
cost-effectiveness threshold.
Setting efficacy requirements for eligibility for an HIVvaccine is particularly difficult.
Because of the key importance of a core groupof high-risk people in influencing the
spread of HIV even a vaccine of low efficacy may proveuseful in disrupting the chain of
transmission if it is targeted to this group. On the otherhand, at least theoretically, an im-
perfectly effective HIV vaccine could increase the spreadof HIV, since people might
adopt riskier behaviors if they felt they had reducedthe chance of infection by taking an
imperfect HIV vaccine. This outcome seems unlikely, however,since in steady state, an
imperfectly effective vaccine could also potentially makethe highest activity peopleNew Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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more hopeful about their chances of being uninfected, and thereforeless likely to adopt
risky behavior. Delivery of an HIV vaccinemay have to use very different channels than
delivery of existing childhood vaccines, particularlyif it is targeted to such a coregroup.
Little is known about the costs of reaching suchgroups.
7. Note that the problem of inducing firmsto conduct research and developmenton vac- cines for which they expect the governmentto be the major purchaser is in someways
similar to the problem of inducing firmsto conduct research and developmenton weap-
ons for which they expect governments will be the majorpurchaser. In each case, the
government must convince the firms contemplating undertakingresearch that it will not
take advantage of them by insistingon low prices once they have already sunk their in-
vestments in research. Procurement rules for the U.S.Department of Defense do not in-
struct procurement officers to purchase ordersat the lowest possible price, but instead to
purchase at a price that covers suppliers'costs. The formulas used for calculating costs
typically allow firms to cover more than manufacturingcosts, which in turn provides an
incentive for firms to invest in research and developmentto produce attractive products
that allow them to win procurementcontracts. Rogerson (1994) suggests that thisserves
as a reputational mechanism for encouraging research by defensecontractors. The De-
fense Department has an advantage in that it isa long-standing institution, with a well
developed reputation about how it treatscontractors, and contractors can counton the desire of the Defense Department tomaintain a reputation for the future, because
the continued existence of the Defense Departmentseems assured. Unfortunately, the
long-term future of a vaccine purchaseprogram is less certain.
Unfortunately, there is a history of antagonism betweenthe pharmaceutical industry
and existing international vaccine purchasers suchas the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO) and the United Nations' Children'sFund (UNICEF), which have a culture
of trying to purchase vaccines at the minimumpossible price. These institutions, there-
fore, might have difficulty administeringa program designed to increase private sector
incentives for vaccine development.
On the other hand, if the program maintaineda single fund which could be used to
purchase vaccines for any of several different diseases,then potential vaccine developers
might fear that once they had investedmoney in developing a vaccine, the vaccine pur-
chase program would try topay a very low price for the vaccine, hoping tosave its re-
sources to purchase vaccines for other diseases. This problemcould be addressed by
maintaining separate funds (or makingseparate financial commitments) for different
diseases.
Setting low prices is the most likelyway that the program could take advantage of
vaccine developers. Program adjudicatorsconcerned with public health will have lim-
ited incentives to insist on further trials, forexample, because they will presumably want
to get an effective vaccine into the field.
This is illustrated vividly by the apparentlymeager prospects of the Wyeth-Ayerst
rotavirus vaccine in developing countries after itwas withdrawn from the U.S. market
following evidence that it causes intussusception inrare cases. The benefits of the vaccine
are likely to outweigh by far its risks in developing countries,where rotavirus kills
three-quarters of a million children eachyear. Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that the
vaccine will ever be widely used.
Willingness to pay is also likely to be higher forcountries with a greater burden of
disease, but requiring a larger co-payment fromcountries with a greater disease burden
seems inequitable and is likely to be politically infeasible.112
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It might therefore, for example, be appropriateto specify that the program could re-
quire proof of efficacy over some extendedperiod for sporozoite malaria vaccines.
If interest were paid on accounts, countrieswould be under less time pressure to
reach agreement with vaccine developers,and therefore might have such a strong bar-
gaining position that they could preventvaccine developers from recovering their re-
search costs. Note that vaccine developers areautomatically under time pressure to reach
a deal with purchasers, becausetheir patent is time limited. Moreover, if interestis not
paid on individual country accounts, then anyinterest accumulated on the program
could be used to fund grants for basic vaccineresearch, or allocated to countries where
disease prevalence had increased since the program wasestablished.
Payments by third parties are also difficult toregulate. Suppose a Swiss firm invents
a malaria vaccine which is noteffective against the strains of malaria prevalent in some
country, and therefore is not appropriatefor that country. The government of Switzer-
land or a foundation supported by the firmcould provide aid for purchasers to use to-
wards their copayments. With a 20% copayment,this would allow the government of
Switzerland or the foundation to spend 1 dollar to raise5 dollars for the company.
It is worth noting that currently, themedical profession and society as a whole seem
to weight DALYs caused by sideeffects much more heavily than DALYs saved.
Information about the number of lives or DALYssaved might become available only
gradually, and therefore, if this approach wereadopted, it might theoretically be best to
condition payments on long run outcomes. Forexample, it might initially be unclear
whether a vaccine provides protectiononly temporarily, or indefinitely. The extent to
which a vaccine prevents secondary infectionsmight also be difficult to predict in ad-
vance. Initial bonus payments tovaccine developers could be based on conservativeesti-
mates of lives or DALYs saved andadditional payments could be made later, depending
on the realization of lives orDALYs saved. Of course, if payments weredelayed, accu-
mulated interest would have to be paid as well.Basing bonus payments to vaccine devel-
opers on realized DALYs or livessaved, rather than on the results of the clinicaltrials re-
quired for regulatory approval, creates betterincentives to develop vaccines that will
work in the real world, rather than only inclinical trials, where it is easier to make sure
that delivery protocols are followedexactly. Moreover, if bonus payments could be
claimed after a vaccine had already beenused, it would be much more difficult for a
price setting committee within the vaccinepurchase program to refuse to pay a remuner-
ative price. Before a vaccine is used in thefield, the committee could argue that it de-
serves only a small bonus,citing potential problems with the vaccine.However, if the
vaccine is used, and it reduces the burdenof malaria by 90%, it will be very hard for the
committee to argue that it is ineffective.(Exceptions to this are new diseases, such as HN,
for which predictions of prevalence in theabsence of a vaccine are likaly to be particu-
larly inaccurate.)
Basing incentives on mortality ratherthan DALYs might be attractive, since mortality
is easier for the public to understandand perhaps less subjective and open to manipula-
tion. On the other hand, it may be best to moreclosely tie incentives to objectives by re-
warding DALYs saved. It is desirable to giveresearchers incentives to reduce morbidity
as well as mortality, and toguard against side effects that cause morbidity.
For example, in Africa HIV prevalence canbe taken as a good indicator of future HIV
deaths and disability, but prevalence of malaria maybe a poor indicator of the total bur-
den of malaria, since a vaccine mightgreatly reduce malaria mortality without prevent-
ing infection.New Vaccine Markets II: Design Issues
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If the vaccine purchaseprogram were an international organization, it isnot clear what court would have authorityto rule on intellectual property rightsquestions. One option would be to spend funds from eachdonor in accordance with the intellectual
property rights laws of that country For example,U.S. funds would not be usedto pur- chase vaccines that violate U.S.patents.
Excluding countries that would have boughtvaccine in the absence of aprogram at prices greater than or equal to the pricepaid by the program would, however,increase incentives to develop vaccines. A slidingscale of copayments could be usedto gradually phase out the program.
As discussed in the companionpaper, advocates for grant-funded researchprograms may have incentives to be over-optimistic about theprospects for easily developing vac-
cines. The Institute of Medicine estimatedin 1986 that a malaria vaccine could bedevel- oped for $35 million. This estimate is fartoo low. From the limited description oftheir methodology, it seems that their cost estimateassumes success in every stage of the vac-
cine development process, while in fact,it is likely that many different candidatevac- cines will have to be tried beforea usable vaccine is developed. A further indicationthat the Institute of Medicine's estimateswere over-optimistic lies in their 1986 prediction
that a malaria vaccine could be licensedwithin 5 to 10 years.
Regulators may require large sampleseven for vaccines for diseases with higher inci-
dence, because they believe it isespecially important to detect potential sideeffects of vaccines, since they are administered to healthypeople.
The life of a patent is 20 years. However,a vaccine would only reach the marketsev- eral years after the date of application fora patent. The effective life of a patent is the
number of years remaining on the patent fromthe time that it is first broughtto market. Shulman, DiMasi, and Kaitin (1999)report that the average effective patent lifefor new drugs and biologicals is 11.2years under the Waxman-Hatch Act, whichgranted extra protection to inventors to partially makeup for loss of patent life during regulatoryre- view. Without the Act, patent lifewould be 8.2 years. The Actcovers the U.S. only, and there is no reason to believe that developingcountries wifi offer similar patentprotec- tion. As noted above, a requirementto license vaccines after 10 years couldpotentially be built into the program.
Since the quantity purchased wouldstay constant, total revenue would risein pro- portion to price.
Another option would be topreannounce that if no vaccine had been developed bya certain date, the price would start growingautomatically. However, it is probably better
to let future decision makers choose whetheror not to increase the price, since insome scenarios it would be optimal not to increasethe price. For example, there wouldbe no need to increase the price if generaltechnological advances in biology reducedthe ex- pected cost of developing a vaccine sufficientlythat many firms decided topursue vac- cines.
One potential problem with this approachis that vaccine developers mightincorpo- rate unnecessary late-patentedcomponents in the vaccine to qualify fora higher price. However, a committee could ruleon what were the key patents used ina given vaccine,
so simply adding an extra useless patent wouldnot lead to a higher vaccine price.
I am considering the case in which thereis only one potential patented vaccine,so the winner reaps the entire reward.114
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29. For example, rotavirus vaccine wasrecently withdrawn from the U.S. market, atleast
temporarily, following reports of side effects.
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